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IN THE WEEDS WITH THOMAS: MORSE, IN LOCO 
PARENTIS, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, AND THE 
NARROWEST VIEW OF STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS 
William C. Nevin∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In writing for the English Court of the Exchequer in the 
case of Winterbottom v. Wright,1 Baron Robert Rolfe codified 
into English law a maxim almost as old as the law itself. “Hard 
cases, it has been frequently observed,” Rolfe wrote, “are apt to 
introduce bad law.”2 In Winterbottom, Rolfe and his fellow 
judges denied recovery to a plaintiff in a particularly troubling 
case of negligence,3 but Rolfe’s statement—that difficult cases 
with troubling facts often result in bad law—was a universal 
one. As long as there have been judges, they have been forced 
to contend with all too sympathetic plaintiffs desperate for 
relief where the law can grant none. Giving into human nature 
and bending to suit these plaintiffs, according to Rolfe, results 
in bad law, either from the bench or the legislature.4 
 
∗ Lecturer, journalism and speech at the University of West Alabama. B.A., 2007, 
Communication, University of Alabama; J.D., 2010, University of Alabama School of 
Law; Ph.D. candidate, 2014, Communication and Information Sciences, University of 
Alabama. The author would like to thank the editors of this journal for their insights, 
suggestions, and professionalism in the process of preparing this article for publication. 
 1  Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. of Pleas) 406; 10 M. 
& W. 109, 116. 
 2  Id. at 116 (Rolfe, J., concurring). 
 3  Id. Winterbottom, the plaintiff, was hired by the postmaster to deliver mail. 
Wright, the defendant, was responsible for the maintenance of the mail coach driven by 
Winterbottom. After the coach collapsed, Winterbottom sued, claiming that Wright had 
breached his duty of care. Rolfe and his fellow judges denied relief and found English 
law allowed for either a duty of care in contract or tort—not both. The resulting prece-
dent left consumers who were injured by defective products no redress for much of the 
nineteenth century. 
 4  See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 905 
(2006) (noting that, much like case law, legislation “made in the wake of a highly sali-
ent disaster, or made in the wake of legislative hearings featuring sympathetic victims” 
is subject to “a distorted view of the nature of those controversies and the proper reso-
lution of them.”). 
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Yet there is another type of “hard case”—one where the 
plaintiff is so unlikable, so flawed that even with the law on his 
side, judges are tempted to stretch rulings simply to avoid 
siding with such an unfortunate individual.5 In this vein of 
hard cases, there have been few more difficult in the recent 
history of the Supreme Court than Morse v. Frederick.6 
In Morse, the Court was confronted by the thoroughly 
unsympathetic Joseph Frederick,7 an eighteen-year-old high 
school senior who decided to perpetrate a silly prank with his 
friends so that they might get on television as the Olympic 
torch relay passed through their town.8 However, their stunt, 
hoisting a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” was 
promptly disrupted by their high school principal, Deborah 
Morse.9 
The question before the Court in Morse can be phrased 
simply enough as an inquiry into whether the First 
Amendment protected a banner that was blasphemous, facially 
absurd, and a possible endorsement of illegal drugs.10 The 
majority answered in the negative, finding the pro-drug 
message was simply too much to bear.11 The majority’s 
conclusion was lamentable enough for those in favor of student 
speech rights, but Justice Clarence Thomas went even further 
in his concurring opinion. For a while the majority at least 
tried to narrow the impact of its decision,12 Justice Thomas 
opined that the landmark student speech case Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District13 was “without 
 
 5  See generally David J. Salvin, The Wrongful Termination Roller Coaster, 39 
ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 16, 17 (1997) (describing a wrongful termination lawsuit 
where the plaintiffs, indicted on multiple felony charges, were “very unlikeable” and 
resulted in a court that “appeared motivated to find for the defendants.”). 
 6  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 7  Frederick’s maturity and the value (or lack thereof) in his speech is reminis-
cent of plaintiff Matthew Fraser’s pun-laden, sexually tinged speech before a student 
assembly at the heart of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
In Fraser, the Court found the plaintiff’s speech to be “plainly offensive” and unprotect-
ed in a school setting. Id. at 683.  
 8  Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115−16 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 9  Id. at 1115. For a full discussion of the facts, see Part Ia, infra. 
 10  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. at 400. 
 11  Id. at 403.  
 12  See infra Parts I, II. 
 13  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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basis in the Constitution.”14 
Justice Thomas’s argument to sack Tinker was based 
primarily on his view that student speech rights are not 
supported by the earliest practices in American public schools. 
In his fundamentally originalist15 concurrence, Justice Thomas 
employs a wide range of historical sources to come to the 
conclusion that nineteenth-century public schools did not 
recognize First Amendment rights for students.16 In short, as 
Justice Thomas wrote, “[T]eachers taught, and students 
listened. Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers 
did not rely solely on the power of ideas to persuade; they relied 
on discipline to maintain order.”17 This “order,” as evidenced by 
the historical support Justice Thomas gathers for his position, 
was enforced by severe, often brutal forms of corporal 
punishment that the justice all too easily excuses.18 Justice 
Thomas grounds his claim with the legal doctrine of in loco 
parentis, a principle from English common law by which 
parents delegate authority over their children to the state for 
the purposes of education.19 However, a cursory glance to other 
documents from the period finds at least scattered opposition to 
corporal punishment and carte blanche authority for school 
personnel to discipline children, a contrast to the monolithic 
position the Justice portrays.20 Ultimately, his conflation of free 
speech rights with the ability of turn-of-the-century 
schoolmasters to savagely punish the children in their care is 
at best a non sequitur. Justice Thomas may be alone among his 
fellow justices on the Court in his stance that children have no 
rights under the First Amendment, but it is still a shocking 
position to those at least nominally supportive of free 
 
 14  551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 15  See infra Part IIc, for a full exploration of Justice Thomas’ use of originalism 
in his Morse concurrence. 
 16  551 U.S. at 412. 
 17  Id. 
 18  As Thomas writes, “the idea of treating children as though it were still the 
19th century would find little support today.” Id. While he is presumably referring to 
corporal punishment, he is unclear at best. 
 19  Id. at 413. 
 20  See infra notes 204–214, 219–221, 232, and accompanying text (explaining 
that a historical inquiry, far from the cohesive narrative Justice Thomas presents, into 
the relevant period of the mid-nineteenth century reveals a liberalization in attitudes 
toward children and building opposition regarding the application of corporal punish-
ment in public schools). 
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expression. 
In relying on principles of originalism for his concurring 
opinion in Morse, Justice Thomas exposes a fundamental 
weakness with this interpretive method in that the outcome is 
driven largely by a subjective historical inquiry. Part II 
examines the three mainstream opinions from Morse that, 
more or less, would leave the Tinker standard for deciding 
student speech cases intact.21 Part III takes up an examination 
of Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion, looking at his use of 
originalism and his embrace of the in loco parentis doctrine 
before then examining some of the historical material the 
Justice uses to support his assertions. Part III will contrast the 
historical resources and cases cited by Justice Thomas with 
others from the period that show an evolving attitude toward 
children and a moderation of public schools. Finally, the paper 
will conclude in Part IV with final thoughts on the impact of 
Justice Thomas’ opinion and originalism as applied Morse. 
II. EIGHT JUSTICES AND MORSE V. FREDERICK 
A. The Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice John Roberts began the majority opinion22 by 
labeling the viewing of the Olympic torch relay as a “school-
sanctioned and school-supervised event” and framing Morse’s 
interpretation of the banner as a pro-drug message as a 
reasonable one—certainly a harbinger of unfortunate things to 
come for Frederick.23 Chief Justice Roberts then laid out the 
familiar student speech touchstones, moving from Tinker24 to 
 
 21  See Kenneth W. Starr, Bong Hits And The Enduring Hamiltonian-
Jeffersonian Colloquy, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2008) (“The Justices also 
came together, more substantively, on the continuing vitality of Tinker. Eight of the 
nine Justices would embrace the Tinker framework, and thus stare decisis values car-
ried the day. Only Justice Thomas would have scuttled the entire enterprise and begun 
anew.”). 
 22  The majority opinion of the Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, was 
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Thomas, again, offered 
his concurrence, which will be the focus of this paper. Justice Alito wrote a concurring 
opinion joined by Justice Kennedy. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and dis-
sented in part. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented. 
 23  Morse, 551 U.S. at 396. 
 24  Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/14  3:46 PM 
2] IN THE WEEDS WITH THOMAS 253 
 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser25 and Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,26 before concluding, “schools may 
take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from 
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal 
drug use.”27 
The facts of the case, as Chief Justice Roberts presented 
them, are relatively straightforward. As the Olympic torch 
relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, Juneau-Douglas High 
School Principal Deborah Morse allowed staff members and 
students to leave class to observe the torch as it passed the 
school.28 Students waited for the relay on both sides of the 
street—one side on school grounds, the other outside of school 
property.29 Frederick was “late to school that day,” as Chief 
Justice Roberts writes,30 but the Ninth Circuit’s opinion made 
it clear he was never actually on school grounds.31 When 
Frederick did make it to the relay, he stood across the street 
from the school, where “rambunctious” students were 
“throwing plastic cola bottles and snowballs and scuffling with 
their classmates.”32 As the torch passed, Frederick and his 
friends erected a fourteen-foot banner that read, “BONG HiTS 
4 JESUS”33 in order to attract attention from the television 
cameras covering the relay.34 Morse then crossed the street to 
demand the students take down the banner, and all but 
Frederick complied.35 Frederick was subsequently suspended 
for eight days under a school board policy prohibiting “public 
expression that . . . advocated the use of substances that are 
 
 25  Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  
 26  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 27  Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 28  Id.  
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006). According to the cir-
cuit court, Frederick’s truancy was apparently the result of a snowed-in driveway. 
 32  Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. Chief Justice Roberts ultimately concluded that 
Frederick was effectively a student and therefore subject to school discipline. Id. at 
401. Therefore, it seems strange that the majority would point out the “rambunctious” 
nature of the other students at the torch relay if indeed it was a situation where teach-
ers and other administrators were free to enforce school discipline. In anything, the 
behavior of the other students suggests that this was not a school activity and that 
Frederick’s argument to that point should not have been so easily dismissed. See id.   
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at 401. 
 35  Id. at 398. 
Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/14  3:46 PM 
254 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
 
illegal to minors.”36 
After dismissing Frederick’s argument that the Court’s 
school speech jurisprudence should not apply,37 Chief Justice 
Roberts then turned to the “cryptic” message on Frederick’s 
banner.38 He posits there are at least two interpretations for 
the words: either a command to take drugs or a celebration of 
illegal drug use. Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that for the purposes of the majority’s analysis, there is no 
substantive difference between the two.39  Chief Justice Roberts 
basically cast aside both Frederick’s argument that the phrase 
was a meaningless word salad and the dissents’ view that it 
represented an attempt to advance debate on drug policy as he 
concluded that the banner was reasonably viewed as promoting 
illegal drug use.40 
With this determination of what was at least a reasonable 
interpretation of a somewhat unclear banner,41 the issue for the 
majority shifted from free expression and student speech rights 
in the abstract to specifically whether school officials can 
“restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”42 In 
answering in the affirmative, Chief Justice Roberts once again 
returned to the Court’s student speech jurisprudence. The 
Chief Justice focused on what he found to be two central points 
from Fraser: (1) students in a public school have a more limited 
right to free expression as compared to adults and (2) that the 
“material and substantial disruption” standard established in 
 
 36  Morse, 551 U.S. at 398 (citing App. Pet. Cert. 53a). Morse originally suspend-
ed Frederick for ten days, but the student’s punishment was reduced to time served 
(eight days) by the Juneau School District superintendent.   
 37  Id. at 400–01. Frederick argued that since he was not on school property and 
he had technically not attended school that day, then he should not be subject to school 
discipline. Quoting Morse’s petition for certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the 
argument, writing, “Frederick cannot ‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during 
school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.’” Id. at 401 
(citation omitted). 
 38  Id. at 401. 
 39  Id. at 402. 
 40  Id. at 402–03. 
 41  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 402 (noting that there were “at least” two interpreta-
tions of the banner: an “imperative” to use illegal drugs and a celebration of drug use). 
See also id. (“Gibberish is surely a possible interpretation of the words on the banner, 
but it is not the only one, and dismissing the banner as meaningless ignores its unde-
niable reference to illegal drugs.”). 
 42  Id. at 403. 
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Tinker is not the only frame for analysis where student speech 
is concerned.43 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that 
Tinker “is not the only basis for restricting student speech,”44 as 
he laid out the seriousness of the drug problem in American 
schools: 
The problem remains serious today. About half of American 
12th graders have used an illicit drug, as have more than a 
third of 10th graders and about one-fifth of 8th graders. 
Nearly one in four 12th graders has used an illicit drug in the 
past month. Some 25% of high schoolers say that they have 
been offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property 
within the past year . . . . Thousands of school boards 
throughout the country—including JDHS—have adopted 
policies aimed at effectuating this message. Those school 
boards know that peer pressure is perhaps “the single most 
important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,” and 
that students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in 
school appear to tolerate such behavior.45 
He noted that, while Tinker prohibited the squelching of 
expression due to a mere fear of disturbance, the danger with 
this banner is “more serious and palpable” with “[t]he 
particular concern to prevent student drug abuse . . .  
extend[ing] well beyond an abstract desire to avoid 
controversy.”46 The specter of illegal drugs and the possible 
harmful consequences from Frederick’s banner became the 
ultimate deciding issue for Chief Justice Roberts and the 
majority. 
In closing, Chief Justice Roberts offered some hints as to 
how the majority opinion should be properly interpreted. First, 
he wrote that Frederick’s banner did not merit censorship due 
to its perceived offensiveness, like in Fraser; rather, because of 
its “promotion of illegal drug use.”47 Chief Justice Roberts 
points out, “much political and religious speech might be 
perceived as offensive to some.” Considering this, it appears the 
majority leaves room for possibly offensive political and 
religious student speech to receive protection under the Tinker 
 
 43  Id. at 404–05. 
 44  Id. at 406. 
 45  Id. at 407–08 (citations omitted). 
 46  Id. at 408–09. 
 47  Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. 
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standard.48 
Chief Justice Roberts then argued that the majority opinion 
and the dissent authored by Justice John Paul Stevens were 
not entirely dissimilar. They differed, he noted, only on the 
question of whether the banner promoted illegal drugs.49 Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote, “[t]he dissent’s contrary view on that 
relatively narrow question hardly justifies sounding the First 
Amendment bugle.”50 
Authorities are mixed concerning the ultimate 
consequences the majority opinion in Morse will have on 
student speech rights.51 Some argue that Chief Justice Roberts 
created an entirely new standard for examining student speech 
by basing a school’s authority on its obligation to protect 
students.52 This new standard could be both “amorphous” and 
troubling, as at least one writer contends, due to the Court’s 
interpretation of “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as a direct call to try 
illegal drugs—suggesting that school administrators are likely 
to aggressively interpret student speech as harmful.53 However, 
due to Chief Justice Roberts’s careful attempts to narrow the 
majority opinion, Professor Mark W. Cordes believes that 
Morse does not significantly erode student speech rights.54 As 
Cordes writes, 
What Morse once again makes clear, and what the Court has 
stated in its previous decisions, is that the free speech rights 
 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Compare Francisco M. Negron, Jr., The Unwitting Move Towards A “New” 
Student Welfare Standard In Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1221, 1224 (2009). (“Where Tinker, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and 
Fraser spoke to a school’s ability to regulate student expression with regard to disrup-
tion, curricular control, and offensive language, in Morse, the Court premised its rule 
on none of these bases specifically, but rather it articulated the school’s interest as one 
that involves its ability to safeguard or protect student well-being.”) and Charles Chu-
lack, The First Amendment Does Not Require Schools to Tolerate Student Expression 
That Contributes to the Dangers of Illegal Drug Use: Morse v. Frederick, 46 DUQ. L. 
REV. 521, 536 (2008) with Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After 
Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 657, 660 (2009) (“[A] close reading 
of Morse suggests that viewpoint restrictions on core speech will certainly be subject to 
the Tinker standard, in which schools can prohibit speech only when it poses a very 
real threat to substantially interfere with school operations or would infringe on the 
rights of other students.”). 
 52  Negron, supra note 51, at 1224. 
 53  Chulack, supra note 51, at 536. 
 54  See Cordes, supra note 51, at 660, 679. 
Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/14  3:46 PM 
2] IN THE WEEDS WITH THOMAS 257 
 
of high school students must be analyzed in light of the 
special characteristics and purpose of public high schools. 
This is neither remarkable nor disconcerting. Schools don’t 
exist to facilitate free speech, but rather to educate students, 
and students’ free speech interests must be tailored to a 
school’s unique environment. . . . [A] close reading of Morse 
suggests that viewpoint restrictions on core speech will 
certainly be subject to the Tinker standard, in which schools 
can prohibit speech only when it poses a very real threat to 
substantially interfere with school operations or would 
infringe on the rights of other students.55 
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that is 
both narrow and almost entirely predicated upon the fact that 
Frederick’s banner contained a reference to illegal drugs. 
However, other members of the Court took issue with both the 
Chief Justice’s conclusion and its scope. 
B. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion 
On its face, the concurring opinion by Justice Samuel Alito 
appears to be an effort to narrow the majority’s holding while 
explaining some of Justice Alito’s beliefs regarding student 
speech rights. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, began his opinion by stating his belief that the 
majority’s decision “goes no further than to hold that a public 
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would 
interpret as advocating illegal drug use.”56 He further stated 
that the opinion “provides no support for any restriction of 
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any 
political or social issue.”57 Furthermore, according to Justice 
Alito, this prohibition on the regulation of student speech 
would be extended to cover expression on the “war on drugs” or 
“legalizing marijuana for medicinal uses.”58 
In discussing student speech jurisprudence, Justice Alito 
both began with the assertion that Tinker was rightly decided 
and that administrators are not due unquestioned deference 
when making decisions regarding student speech.59 He 
 
 55  Id. at 660.  
 56  Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
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concluded, however, that Bethel and Hazelwood allow for the 
censorship of speech outside of the rigorous “substantial 
disruption” standard,60 but he again cautioned that he joined 
the majority opinion only on the understanding that the 
decision does not call for any further regulation of student 
speech due to the “special characteristics” of public schools.61 
Justice Alito also refuted the argument that the First 
Amendment allows school administrators to censor any speech 
that disrupts a school’s “educational mission,” writing 
[t]he “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by 
the elected and appointed public officials with authority over 
the schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a 
result, some public schools have defined their educational 
missions as including the inculcation of whatever political 
and social views are held by the members of these groups. . . . 
The “educational mission” argument would give public school 
authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social 
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed. 
The argument, therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First 
Amendment.62 
Justice Alito next rejected a key assertion from Justice 
Thomas’ concurrence—namely that school administrators act 
in loco parentis in regard to student discipline.63 “It is a 
dangerous fiction,” Justice Alito wrote, “to pretend that parents 
simply delegate their authority—including their authority to 
determine what their children may say and hear—to public 
school authorities.”64 Parents, he argued, have no real choice in 
whether to send their children to public schools, and they have 
little chance to control what happens in the school setting—
thereby making the in loco parentis argument inappropriate.65 
However, if Justice Alito’s intention was to narrow the 
scope of the majority’s decision, he unnecessarily got in his own 
way66 when he stated that any alteration of the “usual free 
 
 60  Id. at 422–23. 
 61  Id. at 423. 
 62  Morse, 551 U.S. at 423. 
 63  Id. at 424. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  See Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: 
Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008). 
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speech rules”67 in public schools must arise from a special 
circumstance in the school setting. In Morse, he wrote the 
circumstance was “the threat to the physical safety of 
students.”68 From there, Justice Alito expounded on the 
potential dangers of school attendance, arguing that students 
face dangers they might otherwise avoid in attending schools. 
Parents, he continued, cannot provide guidance and protection 
in the school setting, and students may be sharing close 
quarters with other students who would physically harm 
them.69 “Experience shows,” as Justice Alito concludes, “that 
schools can be special places of danger.”70 
Even though Justice Alito took great pains to say he joined 
the majority only because Frederick’s banner did not include 
any form of political speech regarding “the wisdom of the war 
on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use,”71 lower 
courts have interpreted his lone paragraph on “special 
characteristics” and school safety to allow for the censorship of 
violent and homophobic student speech.72 According to 
Professor Clay Calvert, “if Justice Samuel Alito hoped his 
concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick would be interpreted 
narrowly by lower courts, he might not have written so 
much.”73 
Thus even if his intention had been to craft a narrowing 
lens through which to view the majority opinion, Justice Alito’s 
concurrence has been distorted by some courts to permit 
more—not less—censorship of student expression predicated on 
the notion of student safety. “[E]ven as the concurrence 
attempted to contain the Court’s decision to illegal drug 
messaging,” Francisco M. Negron argues, “it validated the 
existence of a new standard premised on student welfare.”74 
However, according to Professor Mark W. Cordes, when Justice 
 
 67  551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 422 (quoting id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 72  Calvert, supra note 66, at 9. Court decisions employing this broad, perhaps 
unintended, interpretation of Justice Alito’s opinion include Ponce v. Socorro Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007), Boim v. Fulton Cnty Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 
(11th Cir. 2007), and Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (2008).   
 73  Id. at 9. 
 74  Negron, supra note 51, at 1227. 
Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/14  3:46 PM 
260 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
 
Alito’s concurrence is read in its entirety it only “painted a 
picture in which permissible restrictions on student speech are 
the exceptions, not the rule.”75 
C. Justice Breyer’s Opinion 
In his opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer stated he would 
simply decide the issue of qualified immunity in favor of Morse 
and avoid ruling on the merits of Frederick’s expression, 
thereby dodging the tricky First Amendment issue.76 Even 
though Justice Breyer was the only member of the Court to 
devote serious attention to the matter, the issue of immunity 
for Morse garnered an “unstated” unanimity from a fractured 
Court, according to Kenneth Starr.77 Even the dissenters 
agreed the principal should not be held liable for pulling down 
the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner.78 
Justice Breyer first surveyed the majority opinion and 
found it to be based on viewpoint restrictions, thereby “rais[ing] 
a host of serious concerns.”79 He then pondered whether the 
Court’s decision could be used to justify the censorship 
regarding the underage consumption of alcohol, the medicinal 
use of marijuana, or even “deprecating commentary about an 
antidrug film shown in school.”80 Yet, even with the faults he 
found in the majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote that the 
dissent, if adopted, “would risk significant interference with 
reasonable school efforts to maintain discipline.”81 He 
rhetorically asks, “[w]hat is a principal to do when a student 
unfurls a 14-foot banner (carrying an irrelevant or 
inappropriate message) during a school-related event in an 
effort to capture the attention of television cameras? 
Nothing?”82 
Thus, the answer for Justice Breyer becomes the qualified 
 
 75  Cordes, supra note 51, at 674. 
 76  551 U.S. at 425 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 77  Starr, supra note 21, at 14. 
 78  Id. (noting that the majority had little reason to reach the immunity question 
once the substance of the case was decided for Morse. Starr had a familiarity with the 
case unlike most—he represented Morse in oral arguments before the Court.). 
 79  Morse, 551 U.S. at 426. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. at 427. 
 82  Id. 
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immunity defense, which requires courts to find for 
government employees unless their conduct violates “clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”83 Morse is entitled to 
qualified immunity, Justice Breyer argued, because she “did 
not clearly violate the law” when she took down Frederick’s 
banner, and her belief in the constitutionality of her action was 
reasonable given the “complex and often difficult to apply” 
state of student speech jurisprudence.84 With the qualified 
immunity question potentially answered, it leaves only the 
issue of whether Frederick could obtain injunctive relief as to 
his suspension—an issue clouded by facts that suggest his 
discipline was related, in part, to conduct aside from the 
banner.85 
Stuck between a First Amendment rock and a school 
discipline hard place, Justice Breyer made his home in the 
middle.86 He avoided, as he saw it, “a decision on the 
underlying First Amendment issue [that] is both difficult and 
unusually portentous.”87 
D. Justice Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, began his dissent by pointing out Frederick’s 
banner was erected as a means to gain television exposure.88  
Since it was a simple ploy to gain the attention of television 
cameras and not the promotion of illegal drug use, Justice 
Stevens argued, Principal Morse would have acted to take 
down the banner even if it said “Glaciers Melt!”89 Justice 
Stevens wrote that he was “willing to assume” that 
discouraging the use of drugs is a “valid and terribly important 
interest” and that the “pressing need to deter drug use” 
 
 83  Id. at 429 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 84  Id. at 429–30. 
 85  Morse, 551 U.S. at 433. Justice Breyer cites Frederick’s “disregard of a school 
official’s instruction, his failure to report to the principal’s office on time, his ‘defiant 
[and] disruptive behavior,’ and the ‘belligerent attitude’ he displayed when he finally 
reported” as possible reasons for disciplining him. 
 86  Id. at 427–28. 
 87  Id.  
 88  Id. at 433–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 89  Id. at 434. 
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supports the school district’s policy prohibiting the advocacy of 
illegal substances.90 However, as he saw it, Frederick’s banner 
“was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything,” and 
therefore the student should not have been punished simply for 
a view that the school found to be inappropriate.91 
Justice Stevens then discussed Tinker through the lens of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, arguing that the majority opinion 
“trivializes” the landmark student speech cases by upholding 
viewpoint discrimination and that the banner falls well short of 
Brandenburg’s standard of “incitement to imminent lawless 
action.”92 As Justice Stevens concluded, “[e]ncouraging drug 
use might well in-crease the likelihood that a listener will try 
an illegal drug, but that hardly justifies censorship.”93 
Justice Stevens, though, soon weakened in his resolve, 
stating that “some targeted viewpoint discrimination” in a 
school setting might be justified, as well as speculating that the 
imminence requirement of Brandenburg might need to be 
relaxed at schools.94 Even after he conceded those arguments to 
the majority, Justice Stevens still argued that school officials 
must show how Frederick’s banner interrupted the school’s 
educational mission or how it prompted students to try illegal 
drugs.95 “But instead of demanding that the school make such a 
showing,” Justice Stevens wrote, “the Court punts.”96 
Ultimately, Justice Stevens’ dissent turns on the 
interpretation of the banner, much as Chief Justice Roberts 
characterized his argument.97 As Justice Stevens argues, 
[t]o the extent the Court independently finds that “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS” objectively amounts to the advocacy of illegal 
drug use—in other words, that it can most reasonably be 
interpreted as such—that conclusion practically refutes itself. 
This is a nonsense message, not advocacy. The Court’s feeble 
effort to divine its hidden meaning is strong evidence of 
 
 90  Id. 
 91  Morse, 551 U.S. at 434–35. 
 92  Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 at 449.). 
 93  Id. at 438. 
 94  Id. at 439. 
 95  Id. at 439–41. 
 96  Id. at 441. 
 97  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. 
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that.98 
While admitting, “some high school students . . . are dumb,” 
Justice Stevens nevertheless concluded that Frederick’s banner 
could not prompt other students to try drugs.99 Even if the 
banner is framed as pro-drug advocacy, Justice Stevens argued, 
the message was “at best subtle and ambiguous,” and it should 
be framed in a way to benefit Frederick, the speaker, and not 
any audience.100 Justice Stevens also found that the majority’s 
“ham-handed, categorical approach” might lead to the 
censorship of speech regarding the legalization of drugs in 
addition to the use of alcohol by minors.101 
Justice Stevens concluded by observing how American 
attitudes slowly shifted against both the Vietnam War and 
Prohibition.102 Similarly, as Justice Stevens argued, the debate 
on whether it “would be better to tax and regulate marijuana 
than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use entirely” is an 
important national issue served by even “inarticulately” 
phrased speech.103 In such a political debate, it is the minority 
viewpoint that “most demands the protection of the First 
Amendment” in Justice Stevens’ view. 104 
While Justice Stevens’ dissent is at times blistering in its 
assessment of the majority opinion, there is much agreement to 
be found. As Professor Cordes suggests, Justice Stevens hints 
at a belief that Tinker should be interpreted as allowing 
viewpoint discrimination only where student speech would pose 
a clear and present danger to the school, putting the dissent in 
line with Justice Alito’s concurrence.105 Justice Stevens and the 
other dissenters also agreed that Morse should not have been 
personally liable for her actions in silencing Frederick.106 Still, 
Justice Stevens “particularly lamented the abandonment of the 
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in schools and the 
requirement of a showing of actual disruption to justify 
 
 98  Id. at 444 (emphasis in original). 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 444–45. 
 101  Id. at 445–46. 
 102  Id. at 447. 
 103  Morse, 551 U.S. at 447–48. 
 104  Id. at 448. 
 105  Cordes, supra note 51, at 675. 
 106  Morse, 551 U.S. at 434. 
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punishing student speech” as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky wrote, 
thereby conclusively setting the dissent apart from Chief 
Justice Roberts and the majority.107 
The contrast between Justice Stevens’ dissent and Justice 
Thomas’ concurrence could not be sharper. 
III. JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS STANDS ALONE 
A. Introduction 
 Justice Thomas began his concurring opinion by focusing 
on Morse, but it soon turned to an indictment of Tinker and 
student speech rights. He opened the opinion simply enough in 
stating a public school may indeed prohibit speech it deems as 
advocating illegal drug use.108 His next statement, however, 
serves as a complete break from his colleagues on the Court as 
Thomas declares the reasoning for his opinion: “I write 
separately to state my view that the standard set forth in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. is 
without basis in the Constitution.”109 From there, Justice 
Thomas uses a litany of educational history texts, state court 
cases from the mid-nineteenth century, and appeals to the 
doctrine of in loco parentis to support his view that “the history 
of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as 
originally understood, does not protect student speech in public 
schools.”110  
 While his distance from the rest of the Court might render 
his opinion otherwise meaningless,111 Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence is a fascinating look at how originalism, or the 
doctrine of attempting to interpret the Constitution as the 
Framers or framing generation understood it,112 is applied—or 
perhaps misapplied—to a modern day problem. 
 
 107  Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 727–28 
(2011). 
 108  Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 109  Id. (citation omitted). 
 110  Id. at 410−11. 
 111  Cordes, supra note 51, at 673 (“Though the Thomas concurrence is quite sub-
stantive in nature, his position is so far removed from where the rest of the Court is at 
on the issue of student speech that for all practical purposes his lonely voice is mean-
ingless.”). 
 112  See generally Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and 
the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987).  
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B. Originalism and Justice Thomas 
While originalism as a means of constitutional 
interpretation is nearly as old as the republic itself—indeed 
members of the Framing generation argued “‘the words’ of the 
text were to be interpreted based on ‘the general sense of the 
whole nation at the time the Constitution was formed’”113—the 
modern start for originalism began in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.114 Originalism, as advocated by prominent figures such 
as Judge Robert Bork and Attorney General Edwin Meese, was 
positioned as a counter to the Supreme Court’s abortion 
decisions and other expansive opinions dating back to the 
Warren Court;115 rather than reading rights into the 
Constitution via the “penumbras” and “emanations” in cases 
such as Griswold v. Connecticut,116 jurists employing 
originalism as a means of interpretation would apply the “rules 
of the written [C]onstitution in the sense in which those rules 
were understood by the people who enacted them.”117 Thus the 
originalist is tasked with divining the original intention of 
those who drafted whatever law is before him or her, a mission 
that often requires the use of secondary texts.118 When 
interpreting the Constitution, possible secondary texts as to the 
 
 113  Id. at 1199.  
 114  Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of 
Justices Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 385, 388 (2012). 
 115  See, e.g., id; J,D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology and 
Unenumerated Rights, 199 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 809 (1999) (citing Bork as a promi-
nent advocate of originalism). 
 116  381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In writing for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas 
found a personal right to contraception through the implied constitutional right to pri-
vacy. Id. at 479. 
 117  Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adju-
dication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988). 
 118  See, e.g, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (defining originalism as “the familiar approach to con-
stitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or 
the intentions of its adopters”); Ronald Turner, Was Separate but Equal” Constitution-
al?: Borkian Originalism and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229, 248 (1995) 
(citing Justice Scalia’s observation that originalism “requires the consideration of an 
enormous mass of material, including the records of the ratifying debates of all the 
states when the issue is one of interpreting the Constitution and amendments there-
to.”). See also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U.L. 1, 10 (2009) (de-
fining the most ideologically strenuous version of originalism as the belief that “what-
ever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers’ intent, 
ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive 
target or touchstone”). 
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original meaning held by the Framers include notes from the 
Philadelphia debates and The Federalist.119 
However, reliance on the relatively sparse evidence 
surrounding the debate and ratification of the Constitution 
resulted in critiques that the originalism approach resulted in 
rendering most legal inquiries indeterminate due to the lack of 
answers in the secondary text.120 Furthermore, where there 
was historical evidence, it was often contradictory, as the 
Framers often disagreed amongst themselves.121 An additional 
problem, and perhaps the most devastating one with the 
approach, was that it afforded the most weight and intellectual 
importance to those drafting the Constitution instead of the 
ratifiers—those with the actual power to give the new 
governing documenting binding authority were thus an 
afterthought.122 
As a response to these critiques, originalism underwent 
something of a rebirth, returning as an interpretive tool 
focused on the views of those who ratified the Constitution at 
state conventions.123 This “original understanding originalism” 
soon ran into problems of its own, as Dean Larry Kramer 
observed: 
The indeterminacy argument became stronger, because 
indeterminacy of intent was magnified by the expansion of 
the number of individuals whose intent was to be considered. 
It was not now a small group of fifty-five in Philadelphia 
whose intent was to be considered, but rather a vast body 
including every individual who voted on the Constitution. 
Originalists found themselves trying to recover the 
understanding of an exceedingly large group of people, a task 
made even more difficult because different issues were 
discussed from state to state. There were issues discussed in 
 
 119  Clinton, supra note 112, at 1214. 
 120  Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems With Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 907, 909 (2008).  
 121  Matthew D. Bunker, Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: The “New 
Originalism,” Interpretive Methodology, and Freedom of Expression, 17 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 329, 332 (2012).  
 122  Kramer, supra note 120, at 909. As Dean Larry Kramer so astutely noted, 
prioritizing the intent of the drafters of the Constitution instead of those who ratified it 
“is like giving authority to a speech writer for the President. It is like giving authorita-
tive weight to the intent of the lobbyists who drafted a bill for Congress, as opposed to 
the Congress that actually adopted it.” Id. 
 123  Id. 
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Pennsylvania that just did not come up in Virginia and vice 
versa.124 
This reinvention of originalism also encountered another 
obstacle in the ratification debates as the debates in the 
various states were concerned with whether the Constitution 
itself as a whole should be adopted, not the interpretation of 
individual parts of the document.125 Thus, originalism was 
rebranded once more, this time as “public meaning 
originalism,” the form of originalist interpretation that is most 
prevalent today.126 Public meaning originalism focuses on 
attempting to discern how the average, reasonable person 
would have understood the language of the Constitution when 
it was enacted.127 This average person for the purposes of public 
meaning originalism is one “with the understanding of a 
hypothetical reasonable observer, skilled in contemporary 
grammar and syntax and fully informed about all pertinent 
history.”128 
This assumption of a reasonable individual in the time of 
adoption is not without its own problems, as Dean Kramer 
argues: “Any interpretation of original public meaning is a 
wholly fictitious construct—a construct made possible only 
because the person presenting it has not learned much about 
how the Founding generation actually thought matters should 
be handled.”129 
Originalism as an ideological doctrine is also scrutinized for 
both its close ties to political conservatism (given its 
intellectual origins) and continued support from Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, two notably conservative members of the 
Supreme Court.130 However, as Professor Keith E. Whittington 
 
 124  Id. at 9–10 (footnote omitted). 
 125  Bunker, supra note 121, at 332. 
 126  Kramer, supra note 120, at 910. 
 127  Bunker, supra note 121, at 337–39. 
 128  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or 
Are They Rationalizations For Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8–9 
(2011).  
 129  Kramer, supra note 122, at 913. 
 130  Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 114, at 388. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st 
Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 53, 54 (2004) (noting that, in contrast to more lib-
eral justices such as Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, “[t]oday. . .there are 
Justices, such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who are further to the right 
than Rehnquist and perhaps any other Justices in U.S. history.”). 
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observed, the issue is “not whether the public associates 
originalism with conservatives or conservative politics, but 
whether originalism is a rationalization for conservatism.”131 
These lingering doubts as to the ideological ties between 
conservatism and originalism are only exacerbated when the 
Justices are inconsistent in their use of the interpretive tool, 
thereby raising the specter of ideologically-influenced decision 
making.132 
Justice Thomas specifically has been accused of using 
“originalism where it provides support for a politically 
conservative result” while otherwise ignoring the doctrine.133 
Yet supporters laud for the Justice for “his refusal to conform 
to [opponents’] notions of orthodoxy.”134 These same supporters, 
scholars and jurists who admire Justice Thomas’ use of 
originalism and his willingness to spurn precedent135 see the 
Justice as adhering to a personal philosophy that combines 
originalism and natural law, the idea that there is a moralistic 
source of law other than our codified statutes.136 In essence, 
natural law is a “higher” or “unwritten” law that supersedes 
the written law.137  As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec lays out the 
relevance of natural law, it begins with the Framers drafting a 
Constitution that “was to be informed by natural law embodied 
in the Declaration [of Independence].”138 Those that ratified 
both the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment had “no 
 
 131  Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 29, 29−30 (2011) (“[O]riginalism is a principled theory of constitutional interpre-
tation and not merely a rationalization for conservatism. The association of conserva-
tive politics with originalism is not accidental, however, and conservatives are general-
ly more likely than liberals to find originalism a normatively attractive approach to 
constitutional interpretation.”).  
 132  Fallon, supra note 128, at 16. 
 133  Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, Originalist Sins: The Faux Originalism of Justice 
Clarence Thomas, SLATE (Aug. 1, 2007, 5:16 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2171508. 
 134  John S. Baker, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Clarence Thomas: Natural Law and 
Justice Thomas, 12 REGENT U.L. REV. 471, 472 (1999).  
 135  Id. at 509–10 (concluding “As between a decision that does not adhere to the 
Constitution and the Constitution itself, for Justice Thomas, it is clear which controls. 
That obviously does not mean voting to reverse every or even many decisions with 
which he may disagree. But for Justice Thomas, when judges go very far astray from 
the Constitution, their decisions should be overturned regardless of stare decisis. That 
follows from his view that judges should get the answer right.”). 
 136  Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for the Twenty-First Century—
A Principle of Judicial Restraint, Not Invention, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007).  
 137  Baker, supra note 134, at 472. 
 138  Kmiec, supra note 136, at 399. 
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intention” of displacing this foundation of natural law, 
Professor Kmiec writes.139 Thus, to Professor Kmiec, this gives 
rise to “natural law originalism,” a doctrine that guides the 
interpretation of the Constitution by “inform[ing] the meaning 
of the more grandly phrased constitutional provisions” by 
encouraging justices to not supply their own substantive 
meanings where they would contradict natural law 
principles.140 
“Justice Thomas is a traditional natural law thinker and a 
textualist,” argues Professor John S. Baker, citing insights the 
Justice gave into his philosophy before his confirmation.141 As 
to the scope of natural law’s influence on Justice Thomas, 
Professor Kmiec writes that while natural law thinking has 
been largely absent in Justice Thomas’ work on the Court, the 
silence on this moralistic position has not been complete; 
instead, as properly understood, Thomas has used natural law 
originalism as a way to rein in judicial excess.142 Furthermore, 
as Professor Baker states, Justice Thomas’ opinions “reflect an 
understanding of the role of the judge and the principle of stare 
decisis based on natural law, rather than positivistic, 
principles.”143 This natural law originalism, as practiced by 
Justice Thomas, “debunks legal realism—the notion that law is 
merely will or what the judges say it is—and in so doing, it 
helps elevate the ideal of the rule of law over the inferior 
substitute of the rule of men,” according to Professor Kmiec.144 
 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. at 400–401. Professor Kmiec outlines seven principles of natural law 
originalism: “(1) that the human person has a created reality; (2) that while the under-
standing of human nature may be disputed, that nature exists independent of what we 
may believe about it; (3) that as a foundational premise for forming a government, we 
are created equal in our political status to govern, even as we obviously differ in physi-
cal or intellectual aspects; (4) that natural law, not the government, is the source of 
inalienable rights; (5) that natural law guides personal behavior and is interwoven 
with the common law and the statutes which often codify or “restate” common-law 
principles; (6) that natural law is often stated at too high a level of generality to supply 
specific answers, but as a background principle, it can be highly relevant to legislative 
policy deliberation and choice; and (7) that while the same level of generality precludes 
natural law from being the singular basis for adjudicative outcome, it informs the 
meaning of the more grandly phrased constitutional provisions and should incline the 
Court against supplying its own substantive meaning where doing so would contradict 
the above.” 
 141  Baker, supra note 134, at 502. 
 142  Kmiec, supra note 136, at 411. 
 143  Baker, supra note 134, at 507. 
 144  Kmiec, supra note 136, at 415. 
Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/14  3:46 PM 
270 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
 
Whatever may be the source for Justice Thomas’ 
originalism, it has generally not been received well in the area 
of free expression by other members of the Court, according to 
Professors Derigan Silver and Dan V. Kozlowski.145 After 
undertaking an empirical review of all free expression opinions 
using originalism from Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Thomas, 
Silver and Kozlowski concluded that while Justice Thomas has 
authored five majority opinions addressing free expression 
during his time on the bench, none of his originalist opinions 
garnered the support of a majority of his colleagues.146 
Furthermore, seventy percent of his originalist opinions were 
much like his opinion in Morse in that they were unable to 
garner support from other members of the Court147—surely a 
sign of his “iconoclastic approach to constitutional issues,” as 
Dean Starr wrote in reference to Justice Thomas’ concurring 
opinion in Morse.148 
Outside of the Court, scholars and other critics have found 
Justice Thomas’ originalism opinions in the area of free 
expression to be inconsistent or applied in favor of conservative 
policy preferences.149 In comparing Justice Thomas’ opinions in 
Morse and 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,150 Professors 
Matthew D. Bunker and Clay Calvert found key distinctions—
namely the breadth of originalism and historical investigation 
(Morse represented a “massive deployment of originalism,” 
while 44 Liquormart used a “cursory, if not passing” appeal to 
the doctrine) and Justice Thomas’ use of paternalism.151Writing 
for the online magazine Slate, commentators Doug Kendall and 
Jim Ryan examined two cases from the 2007 term, Morse and 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,152 and Justice Thomas’ concurring opinions in 
 
 145  Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 114, at 418. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Starr, supra note 21, at 4. 
 149  See generally Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Contrasting Concurrences 
of Clarence Thomas: Deploying Originalism and Paternalism in Commercial and Stu-
dent Speech Cases, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 321 (2010); Kendall & Ryan, supra note 133. 
 150  517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 151  Bunker & Calvert, supra note 121, at 356–57 (concluding Justice Thomas 
was “anti-paternalism” in regard to the rights of adults to receive lawful information as 
to the price of alcoholic beverages and “pro-paternalism” where the rights of students to 
speak was concerned). 
 152  Morse, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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both decisions.153 Justice Thomas’ opinion in Morse relies 
heavily on originalism, while his concurrence in Parents 
Involved, a case addressing voluntary school integration, is 
largely lacking in originalism.154 In comparing the two 
opinions, Kendall and Ryan found the lack of originalism in 
Parents Involved to be striking: 
It may be too much to expect any individual justice to be 
perfectly consistent from year to year and across a diverse 
array of cases. But here we have two public-school cases, both 
involving the rights of students, and both decided within days 
of each other, with Justice Thomas writing concurring 
opinions in each case, concurrences that no other justices 
joined. Don’t you think that someone, somewhere, might have 
asked Thomas: “Um, so you ask what the Framers would 
have thought about speech in school but not what they would 
have thought about voluntary integration. Why not?”155 
Given its intellectual origins, ardent supporters and 
average conclusions, originalism has been—and will continue 
to be—a source of controversy on the Court. Justice Thomas, 
while not the only member of the Court to engage in the use of 
the doctrine, has certainly been a prominent user of 
originalism. Morse, in many ways, represents Justice Thomas’ 
quintessential originalist opinion—one, lone Justice using 
sources to arrive at a position outside of mainstream 
jurisprudence. 
C. Originalism on display: Justice Thomas and Morse 
After stating that “the standard set forth in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School Dist. is without basis 
in the Constitution” in his introduction,156 Justice Thomas 
organized his concurring opinion into three sections: in Part I, 
he addressed his view of the history of U.S. public education 
and what it means for students’ free speech rights;157 in Part II, 
he examined the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on student 
speech;158 and in Part III, he restated his arguments in a 
 
 153  Kendall & Ryan, supra note 133. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
 157  Id. at 410–16. 
 158  Id. at 416–19. 
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conclusion.159 
In Part I, and throughout the opinion, Justice Thomas 
relied on a healthy measure of originalism, and he 
demonstrated this approach early in the opinion as he wrote, 
“the history of public education suggests that the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student 
speech in public schools.”160 While Justice Thomas was not 
explicit, he was certainly invoking the “public meaning” version 
of originalism. Therefore, his entire opinion—and Part I 
specifically—should be understood as an endeavor to determine 
what the average person thought of the free speech rights of 
students at the time of (1) the ratification of the Constitution 
and Bill of Rights and (2) the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868.161 
In his introduction to Part I, Justice Thomas wrote, “if 
students in public schools were originally understood as having 
free-speech rights, one would have expected 19th-century 
public schools to have respected those rights and courts to have 
enforced them. They did not.”162 Justice Thomas then devoted 
his attention to showing how little the speech rights of students 
were respected in the earliest of public schools. He did this by 
pointing to the nature of education in the era before moving on 
to discuss the doctrine of in loco parentis and school discipline 
generally.163 
However, what Justice Thomas neglected to consider is that 
the nineteenth century was a time of change, including both 
modernization and liberalization, for the American system of 
public education.164 While his conclusions as to the 
unenlightened state of schools could be accurate as to the 
earliest colonial schools, by the middle of the century—and 
definitely by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted—reforms were taking hold across the country that 
would challenge the assumptions Justice Thomas made about 
 
 159  Id. at 419–21. 
 160  Id. at 410–11. 
 161  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (explaining argument that, to be applied to the states, the amend-
ments contained in the Bill of Rights should be interpreted by examining their public 
meaning at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted).  
 162  Morse, 551 U.S. at 411. 
 163  Id. at 411–12. 
 164  See infra notes 173–186 and accompanying text. 
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the history of public education. 
Justice Thomas painted a dire portrait of student speech 
rights in the earliest American schools, as he argued 
[d]uring the colonial era, private schools and tutors offered 
the only educational opportunities for children, and teachers 
managed classrooms with an iron hand . . . Like their private 
counterparts, early public schools were not places for 
freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas. 
Rather, teachers instilled ‘a core of common values’ in 
students and taught them self-control.165 
Teachers, as Justice Thomas concluded, ruled with harsh 
discipline. Students were punished for behavior deviating from 
school norms of respect and proper etiquette.166 
For the colonial era and the earliest part of the nineteenth 
century, perhaps this portrait is appropriately bleak as 
schoolmasters and others in authority often took the position 
that “[t]he child’s original nature was considered to be evil,” 
according to education scholar Herbert Falk.167 Thus children, 
as Faulk wrote, were subject to instructional and disciplinary 
methods designed to curb this inherent evilness as 
“[r]epression and coercion were the methods of control used by 
both school and society. [Teachers’] failure to accomplish the 
ends sought was interpreted not as the inadequacy of the 
methods themselves, but rather as an indication of inadequate 
application.”168 
Thus, a perpetuating system was created in which the 
Colonial-era schools often sought to repress the natural 
tendencies of the child by applying more and more discipline 
usually in the form of “the rod”—meaning brutal corporal 
punishment.169 These schools were distinctly unmodern, 
choosing to obtain conformity “through rituals of repression 
and even occasionally of terror.”170 
This would mesh well with Justice Thomas’ argument had 
the state of public schools remained static through both the 
 
 165  551 U.S. at 411. 
 166  Id. at 412. 
 167  Herbert Arnold Falk, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 48 (1941). 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Barbara Finkelstein, Dollars and Dreams: Classrooms as Fictitious Message 
Systems, 1790–1930, 31. 
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adoption of the Constitution and the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Yet the middle of the 
nineteenth century was far from static as the era saw 
innovations in education as a broad coalition of civic leaders 
reconceptualized the function of the public school.171 According 
to education scholar Barbara Finkelstein, it was these civic 
leaders and visionaries such as Horace Mann and others that 
truly created what contemporary Americans would consider 
public schools.172 She concluded, “[a]fter 1850, students in rural 
schools no longer sat on benches around the periphery of the 
schoolroom . . . . Grades supplemented whips, report cards 
supplemented spelling exhibitions, and rewards of merit took 
the form of dollar bills with the symbols of banking and 
national progress . . . .”173 
As early as 1833, reform advocates were promoting the 
importance of play in a child’s development and the crucial role 
of at least the mother in a child’s intellectual growth—both 
ideas generally considered as modern innovations in 
education.174 Antebellum reformers experimented with 
different methods of punishment, including what would now be 
labeled as “cognitive structuring” and “empathy arousing” 
techniques.175 These same reformers also began the shift from 
teachers as harsh disciplinarians to warm, loving authority 
figures.176 
As attitudes toward children shifted, so too did public 
sentiment regarding corporal punishment. England recorded 
the first public campaign against child corporal punishment in 
 
 171  Id. at 472 (“[P]hysicians, public school advocates, middling and high-born 
women, labor leaders, and ministers . . . developed a conscious awareness of the influ-
ence of home, church, and neighborhood on the cultivation of moral and civic sensibil-
ity.”). 
 172  Id. at 472–73. 
 173  Id. at 477. 
 174  Caroline Winterer, Avoiding a “Hothouse System of Education”: Nineteenth-
Century Early Childhood Education from the Infant Schools to the Kindergartens, 32 
HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 289, 300 (1992). 
 175  Myra C. Glenn, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 138 (1984) (de-
fining “cognitive structuring” as “the use of reason and suasion to convince a child of 
his wrongdoing and point out to him the harmful consequences of his actions for oth-
ers” and “empathy arousing” as techniques that “cultivate a child’s identification with 
and sympathy for authority figures.”). 
 176  See Id. 
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1669.177 Even before the Civil War, public opinion began to see 
punitive teachers as cruel and tyrannical.178 The 1840s saw an 
appreciable decline in the use of corporal punishment as 
teachers began to shy away from its liberal use179 and apply it 
only in cases of last resort.180 In one example, after a regulation 
requiring Boston schools to record instances of corporal 
punishment was enacted, the practice declined by twenty-five 
percent, with some five hundred schools reporting zero 
whippings in 1846.181 After the Civil War, New Jersey became 
the first state to ban the practice in schools in 1867182—the 
year before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 
While an originalist would perhaps cease the historical 
inquiry with 1868 and the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is important to consider the direction of public 
opinion at the time and how the national consensus was 
changing,183 and that can only been seen by looking at strides 
made shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. 
As the nation advanced from the post-war period to the mid-
1880s, corporal punishment tended to become less frequent and 
was subject to more limitations such as documentation 
requirements, the elimination of corporal punishment for girls, 
and the implicit understanding that it was a last resort for 
punishing students.184 By 1884, while the practice was still 
legal in most areas, its frequent use was “fully understood” as 
“a sure indication of weakness in a teacher” in at least one 
school system.185 When the School Committee of Boston took up 
 
 177  C.B. Freeman, The Children’s Petition of 1669 and Its Sequel, in CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 41, 41 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds., 
1979). 
 178  Glenn, supra note 175, at 33. 
 179  Id. at 58. 
 180  Id. at 128. 
 181  Id. at 136–37. 
 182  Donald R. Raichle, The Abolition of Corporal Punishment in New Jersey 
Schools, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 62, 62 (Irwin A. Hyman 
& James H. Wise eds., 1979).   
 183  See Gerald V. Bradley, Essay on the Bill of Rights: The Bill of Rights and 
Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 417, 420 (1992)  (arguing against “snapshot” original-
ism because “[t]he Constitution is not a collage of photographs of early national Ameri-
ca . . . [t]he Constitution is comprised of principles whose practical import changes with 
time—as America changes—even as the principles remain the same. Indeed, many 
constitutional principles, historically recovered, are intrinsically dynamic.”). 
 184  Falk, supra note 167, at 79. 
 185  Id. at 95 (quoting Quincy, Mass., Annual School Report of the Town of 
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a measure to completely ban the practice in 1889, it was 
defeated in part because the use of corporal punishment had 
already appreciably declined.186 
Considering these facts, Justice Thomas’ portrait of the 
authoritarian landscape of U.S. public education is but half-
finished. His historical inquiry as to the schools of the colonial 
period might indeed be somewhat accurate, but it does not take 
into account the changing nature of U.S. education during the 
middle part of the nineteenth century—a key moment in time 
given the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
With his investigation into the schoolroom complete, Justice 
Thomas next turned to a key argument: that through in loco 
parentis, courts upheld the rights of school administrators to 
“discipline students, to enforce rules, and to maintain order.”187 
The doctrine, as described by Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, is a delegation of authority from parent 
to schoolteacher that allows the instructor to employ “restraint 
and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for 
which he is employed.”188 However, Justice Thomas asserted 
the acceptance of the doctrine by nineteenth-century scholars 
and courts without sufficiently considering, once again, the 
evolution of the education system in the 1800s.189 
However, as many modern legal scholars argue, in loco 
parentis is an anachronism in a discussion of compulsory, 
state-run education.190 As Professor Susan Stuart wrote, “[i]n 
loco parentis assumes a voluntary delegation of parental 
authority and was envisioned during a time of either home-
 
Quincy, Mass., 1883–84). 
 186  Id. at 100. 
 187  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (foot-
note omitted). 
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441). 
 190  See, e.g, Susan Stuart, In loco parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Con-
fused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 971 (2010); Timothy Garrison, 
From Parent to Protector: The History of Corporal Punishment in American Schools, 16 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 117 (2007). See also Richard Howell, Note and Com-
ment, After Morse v. Frederick: The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Takes Another Step Toward Abrogating the Tinker Standard for Student Speech By 
Permitting Restrictions on Speech Which Posese a “Special Danger” to the School Envi-
ronment, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 1046, 1049 (2008) (“The common law doctrine of in loco 
parentis was found to be ‘in tension with contemporary reality.’”) (quoting New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985)).   
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schooling tutors or small residential, private schools.”191 This 
foundation, then, places the doctrine more in line with the 
earlier colonial schools rather than the middle-to-late 
nineteenth-century schools and the schools of today.192 As 
scholar Donald R. Raichle stated, “[a]s the nineteenth century 
progressed . . . . [l]ess and less was the American prepared to 
surrender carte blanche his parental rights to the school no 
matter what the common law might hold.”193 An 1861 letter to 
the editor published in the (Thomasville, Ga.) Southern 
Enterprise summed up the position thusly: “Parents send their 
children to school to be taught, not whipped, buffeted or 
scolded. They do not pay a teacher for doing these things, and 
he who does them, commits a breach of the peace, transgresses 
the law, and subjects himself to prosecution and 
punishment.”194 
Furthermore, the nature of the doctrine as applied to 
student speech is troubling, as Professor Todd A. DeMitchell 
wrote, because “[p]arental rights are not subject to 
constitutional restraints, but public schools must respect the 
constitutional rights of students.”195 Still, Justice Thomas used 
the term in loco parentis a total of fifteen times in his opinion, 
making it “clearly . . . the lynchpin for his analysis,” according 
to Professors Matthew D. Bunker and Clay Calvert.196 
For proof that in loco parentis was an accepted principle in 
courts of the period, Justice Thomas cited197 State v. 
Pendergrass,198 an 1837 North Carolina case that was the first 
to adopt the doctrine in the United States.199 In Pendergrass, 
state authorities brought criminal charges against a teacher 
who whipped a child “with a switch, so as to cause marks upon 
 
 191  Stuart, supra note 190, at 971. 
 192  See id. See also Garrison, supra note 190, at 117 (noting that compulsory at-
tendance laws made in loco parentis less applicable in the public school setting). 
 193  Raichle, supra note 182, at 67. 
 194  Letter to the editor, The Southern Enterprise, February 20, 1861. 
 195  Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone’s Doctrine of In loco 
parentis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 17, 
24. 
 196  Bunker & Calvert, supra note 121, at 348. 
 197  Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 413–14 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 198  State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837). 
 199  Stuart, supra note 190, at 975. 
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her body, which disappeared in a few days.”200 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of in loco 
parentis to remove criminal liability from the teacher, but it 
came with a proviso—namely, that courts would continue to 
review the teacher-child relationship even when discipline was 
involved.201 “If [the teacher] use[s] his authority as a cover for 
malice, and under pretence [sic] of administering correction, 
gratify his own bad passions,” the court wrote, “the mask of the 
judge shall be taken off, and he will stand amenable to justice, 
as an individual not invested with judicial power.”202 
As Justice Thomas argued that “courts struck down only 
punishments that were excessively harsh,”203 he failed to truly 
consider the extent to which courts of the period were willing to 
intercede in the disciplinary procedures of schools. When he 
wrote that in loco parentis “limited the ability of schools to set 
rules and control their classrooms in almost no way,” Justice 
Thomas swept aside the fact that there was judicial inquiry 
into how teachers and schools disciplined students.204 The 
Indiana Supreme Court took this responsibility seriously in 
1853 when, despite ruling for a teacher in a corporal 
punishment case, it wrote 
[h]ence the spirit of the law is, and the leaning of the courts 
should be, to discountenance a practice which tends to excite 
human passions to heated and excessive action, ending in 
abuse and breaches of the peace. Such a system of petty 
tyranny cannot be watched too cautiously nor guarded too 
strictly.205 
Coming twenty years after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but still important to understanding 
the country’s evolving understanding of students, deference to 
administrators, and school punishment,206 the Indiana 
Supreme Court was called again to rule on an issue of school 
 
 200  19 N.C. at 365. 
 201  Id. at 366–67. 
 202  Id. at 367. 
 203  551 U.S. at 416 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 204  Id. 
 205  Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853). 
 206  See Bradley, supra note 183. Justice Thomas himself does not limit the case 
law inquiry to pre-1868 jurisprudence as he cites cases from 1885, 1888, 1890, and 
1915 in addition to older, pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions. See 551 U.S. at 414–
16 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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discipline in Fertich v. Michener.207 In Fertich, a young girl was 
late to school only to find her classroom door locked as the local 
district had a strict policy regarding tardy students.208 The girl 
decided to walk home, and while exposed to the bitter cold of 
eighteen degrees below zero, she developed frostbite on her 
feet.209 The girl’s father sued, claiming that the school was 
responsible for the girl’s injury.210 
The Indiana Supreme Court considered many factors in 
determining the appropriateness of a rule requiring that school 
doors be locked to prevent tardy students from entering.211 “In 
the enforcement of all rules for the government of a school,” the 
court wrote, “due regard must be had to the health, comfort, 
age, and mental as well as physical condition of the pupils, and 
to the circumstances attending each particular emergency.”212 
The court then argued that no rule of general applicability 
should be enforced where that enforcement “will inflict actual 
and unnecessary suffering upon a pupil.”213 In stating that the 
practice of locking the doors on especially cold mornings was a 
violation of this principle, the court concluded, “[a] school 
regulation must, therefore, be not only reasonable in itself, but 
its enforcement must also be reasonable in the light of existing 
circumstances.”214 
Thus, it is against this background of judicial inquiry that 
Justice Thomas’ assertions as to the authority of school officials 
to rule as they saw fit must be judged. While he argued that 
courts of the eighteenth and nineteenth century readily 
accepted the principle of in loco parentis,215 it is clear that 
simple acceptance of the principle did not end judicial 
examination of school rules and school discipline. Rather, 
courts were willing—albeit reluctantly—to intercede between 
students and school officials. 
 
 207  Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 605, 606 (Ind. 1887).  
 208  Id. at 607–08. 
 209  Id. at 608. 
 210  Id. at 606. 
 211  Id. at 609–11. 
 212  Id. at 610. 
 213  Fertich, 11 N.E. at 610 (Ind. 1887). 
 214  Id. at 610–11. 
 215  It is worth noting that the first United States decision to adopt the doctrine, 
State v. Pendergrass,  does not appear in the law until 1837—some sixty years after the 
founding of the Republic. 
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After generally introducing in loco parentis, Justice Thomas 
then cited a number of cases showing how the doctrine was 
applied to student speech, specifically arguing that the 
principle permitted the discipline of students for their 
expression.216 The first case Justice Thomas pointed to on this 
matter was Lander v. Seaver. 217 Lander is an 1859 Vermont 
Supreme Court case in which a student was accused of 
insulting his teacher after school hours as he was passing the 
teacher’s house.218 The child was whipped at school the 
following day. The child’s father later sued, arguing the teacher 
did not have the right to discipline the child for something 
occurring outside of the schoolhouse.219 The Vermont Supreme 
Court, however, disagreed and found the boy’s punishment to 
be just.220 Justice Thomas, quoted the following passage from 
the court’s decision: 
[L]anguage used to other scholars to stir up disorder and 
insubordination, or to heap odium and disgrace upon the 
master; writings and pictures placed so as to suggest evil and 
corrupt language, images and thoughts to the youth who must 
frequent the school; all such or similar acts tend directly to 
impair the usefulness of the school, the welfare of the scholars 
and the authority of the master. By common consent and by 
the universal custom in our New England schools, the master 
has always been deemed to have the right to punish such 
offences. Such power is essential to the preservation of order, 
decency, decorum and good government in schools.221 
The court’s language meshes well with Justice Thomas’ 
narrative, specifically that courts of the period applied in loco 
parentis rigidly and refused to interfere in the disciplinary 
relationship between administrators and students. However, a 
much more illuminating and prescient selection lies in the 
paragraphs above the quote picked by Justice Thomas: 
But where the offense has a direct and immediate tendency to 
injure the school and bring the master’s authority into 
 
 216  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 414–15 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 217  Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859). 
 218  Id. at 120. 
 219  Id. at 120, 125. 
 220  Id. 
 221  Morse, 551 U.S. at 414–15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lander, 32 Vt. at 
121). 
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contempt, as in this case, when done in the presence of other 
scholars and of the master, and with a design to insult him, 
we think he has the right to punish the scholar for such acts if 
he comes again to school. 
The misbehavior must not have merely a remote and indirect 
tendency to injure the school. All improper conduct or 
language may perhaps have, by influence and example, a 
remote tendency of that kind. But the tendency of the acts so 
done out of the teacher’s supervision for which he may 
punish, must be direct and immediate in their bearing upon 
the welfare of the school, or the authority of the master and 
the respect due to him. Cases may readily be supposed which 
lie very near the line, and it will often be difficult to 
distinguish between the acts which have such an immediate 
and those which have such a remote tendency. Hence each 
case must be determined by its peculiar circumstances.222 
The Lander court’s “direct and immediate” language calls to 
mind the “material and substantial” disruption standard that 
would be set by the Supreme Court in Tinker more than one 
hundred years later.223 Furthermore, the Lander court cautions 
that not all potentially disruptive student conduct occurring 
off-campus would be punishable; rather, as the court argued, 
each case should be decided on its own merits224 as opposed to 
the reluctant stance of the judiciary characterized by Justice 
Thomas.225 
The Lander court would go to limit the application of in loco 
parentis—or at least differentiate it from the authority granted 
to parents to discipline children: 
From the intimacy and nature of the relation, and the 
necessary character of family government, the law suffers no 
intrusion upon the authority of the parent, and the privacy of 
domestic life, unless in extreme cases of cruelty and injustice. 
This parental power is little liable to abuse, for it is 
continually restrained by natural affection, the tenderness 
which the parent feels for his offspring, an affection ever on 
 
 222  Lander, 32 Vt. at 120–21. 
 223  Id. at 120; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 
(1969). 
 224  Lander, 32 Vt. at 123–24. 
 225  See 551 U.S. at 414 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Applying in loco parentis, the 
judiciary was reluctant to interfere in the routine business of school administration, 
allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to maintain order.). 
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the alert, and acting rather by instinct than reasoning. 
The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence he 
may not safely be trusted with all a parent’s authority, for he 
does not act from the instinct of parental affection. He should 
be guided and restrained by judgment and wise discretion, 
and hence is responsible for their reasonable exercise.226 
Justice Thomas authoritatively stated “in loco parentis 
limited the ability of schools to set rules and control their 
classrooms in almost no way”227 and “courts struck down only 
punishments that were excessively harsh; they almost never 
questioned the substantive restrictions on student conduct set 
by teachers and schools.”228 However, as demonstrated above, 
in loco parentis was not applied in such strong absolutes. 
Furthermore, in loco parentis was not a guiding principle from 
the earliest days of the country, like Justice Thomas argued.229 
As the nineteenth century progressed, individuals were far less 
likely to accept the idea that public school teachers had the 
right to viciously punish pupils,230 a critical matter for Justice 
Thomas’ “public meaning” inquiry into the free speech rights of 
students.231 
In Parts II and III of his concurring opinion, Justice 
Thomas assailed the Court’s jurisprudence on student 
speech.232 Justice Thomas first addressed Tinker with obvious 
distain and argued the case extended student speech rights 
“well beyond traditional bounds”233—before he explained how 
the Court carved out exceptions from Fraser234 and 
Hazelwood.235 
Justice Thomas then concluded that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion simply created another piecemeal Tinker 
exception, writing “we continue to distance ourselves from 
Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of 
 
 226  Id. at 122–23. 
 227  551 U.S. at 416 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 228  Id. 
 229  See Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 605, 610–11 (Ind. 1887). 
 230  See supra notes 203–213, 218–220, 231, and accompanying text. 
 231  See Raichle supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 232  Morse, 551 U.S. at 416–22. 
 233  Id.  
 234  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 235  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); 551 U.S. at 418 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
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when it operates and when it does not.”236 As he rather 
eloquently and accurately summed up the Court’s 
jurisprudence on student speech, “I am afraid that our 
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in 
schools except when they do not.”237 
Part III illustrated the melding of Justice Thomas’ 
historical findings with his criticism on the current 
understanding of student speech rights.238 “In light of the 
history of American public education,” Justice Thomas 
asserted, “it cannot seriously be suggested that the First 
Amendment ‘freedom of speech’ encompasses a student’s right 
to speak in public schools.”239 He also reinforced his notion of 
the breadth of in loco parentis by pointing to an example where 
a court “refused to find an exception” to the doctrine even 
where a student concerned with a potential fire hazard 
criticized school administrators.240 Before concluding his 
opinion with yet another attack on Tinker, he succinctly stated 
both his core argument and the central, damning issue with his 
stance and methodology: 
To be sure, our educational system faces administrative and 
pedagogical challenges different from those faced by 19th-
century schools. And the idea of treating children as though it 
were still the 19th century would find little support today. 
But I see no constitutional imperative requiring public schools 
to allow all student speech. Parents decide whether to send 
their children to public schools. If parents do not like the 
rules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in 
school boards or legislatures; they can send their children to 
private schools or homeschool them; or they can simply move. 
Whatever rules apply to student speech in public schools, 
those rules can be challenged by parents in the political 
process.241   
Justice Thomas agreed that the current system of U.S. 
education is inherently and fundamentally different from that 
found in the late 1700s and early 1800s—only after he devoted 
 
 236  Id.  
 237  Id. 
 238  Id. at 419-22. 
 239  Id. at 419. 
 240  Id. See Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 52, 148 P. 959 (1915). 
 241  Id. at 419–20 (citation omitted). 
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a considerable amount of attention trying to prove that the two 
are linked via originalism and the public meaning of the First 
Amendment as applied to schools and student speech.242 By 
stating such an obvious truth and then so swiftly brushing it 
aside, Justice Thomas appeared lost in a dogmatic devotion to 
originalism in applying the rules of the one-room schoolhouse 
to today’s complex school no matter the differences. 
Furthermore, if Justice Thomas’ “treating children” quip243 
referred to the period’s practices of corporal punishment, he 
was simply being callous in glossing over the details of the 
cruelties dealt. Under various regimes of corporal punishment 
used in early American schools, children were flogged;244 beaten 
with canes, rulers, rods, fists and books;245 tied to posts;246 
forced to wear burrs strung together;247 lashed for offenses as 
minor as failing to bow at the entrance of strangers;248 had 
chips of wood inserted perpendicularly to hold their jaws 
apart;249 and made to balance on stools for “an hour or so.”250 
Justice Thomas’ opinion, to some extent, is based on the 
“greater-includes-the-lesser” argument,251 meaning that if 
schools had unquestioned authority to inflict harsh corporal 
punishment upon students in the eighteenth and nineteen 
centuries, then certainly they have the ability today to simply 
silence student speech. This certainly ignores the vastly 
different conditions in today’s schools, but, more importantly, it 
in essence celebrates an almost unlimited capacity for cruelty 
toward the youngest and most vulnerable in society. Thus, at 
 
 242  See id. at 410–19. 
 243  See id. at 419 (“To be sure, our educational system faces administrative and 
pedagogical challenges different from those faced by 19th-century schools. And the idea 
of treating children as though it were still the 19th century would find little support 
today.”). See also note 245 and accompanying text, infra. 
 244  Falk, supra note 167, at 48. 
 245  Id. at 54 (“Historians are in agreement that cruel punishments were the 
rule.”). 
 246  Id. at 55. 
 247  John Manning, Discipline in the Good Old Days, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 50, 51 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds., 1979). 
 248  Id. at 52. 
 249  Id. at 59. 
 250  Id. 
 251  See generally Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the 
Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U.L. REV. 227 (1994) (explaining the argument 
and associated logical fallacies). 
Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/14  3:46 PM 
2] IN THE WEEDS WITH THOMAS 285 
 
least from a moral perspective, the corporal punishment from 
this era should never be used to justify any legal argument—
aside from perhaps a call for more judicial scrutiny of school 
administrators. 
Justice Thomas only compounded the matter by suggesting 
those unhappy with school policies could simply work through 
the democratic process for better outcomes. Certainly in an 
ideal world, students and their parents would be able to work 
for change in local districts, but we live in something far short 
of that lofty goal.  Student speech cases—be it war protest arm 
bands in Tinker,252 stories in a high school newspaper that 
make administrators squirm in Hazelwood,253 or the banner in 
Morse254—arise when a speaker is voicing an unpopular and 
minority opinion, and thereby making traditional democratic 
advocacy routes unlikely avenues for success. 
Offering that individuals can simply leave the jurisdiction 
is also an unhelpful and dubious suggestion. For most parents 
and students, private schooling represents a host of difficult 
expenses and leaving a school district is simply not an option—
to say nothing of the complete implausibility of homeschooling 
for most. Logistics aside, asking an individual to move to the 
next town over should never be a serious answer to illegitimate 
treatment.255 
By casting aside the actual concerns and realities of the 
modern educational system in favor of his own dogmatic 
application of rules favored in the colonial era and gone by the 
turn of the twentieth century, Justice Thomas showed himself 
to be out of step with the rest of the Court and many in the 
mainstream legal community. Yet his opinion, by virtue of it 
being given the weight of the highest court in the land, matters 
despite its flaws and outrageous conclusion. 
Originalism as an ideal, as touted by Justice Thomas and 
others, is noble as it claims a faithfulness to the original text 
that modern interpretations dispense with. But originalism in 
practice is something entirely different and more subjective 
than any proponent would care to admit. 
 
 252  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 253  Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 263. 
 254  Morse, 551 U.S. at 396. 
 255  See Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitu-
tional Rights, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 30 (2009). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Even if Justice Thomas’ opinion never commands a 
majority of the Court—and there are no signs it ever will—his 
views on student speech and how he came to shape those views 
still matter. Unless the Justice has some type of seismic 
conversion in the way of his thinking on the issue, school 
administrators will have at least one vote in their pocket when 
they come to the Supreme Court looking to silence a student 
speaker. Justices Alito and Kennedy, while they sided with 
Morse and despite whatever accidental damage they may have 
done to student speech rights, at least came to their decision 
honestly and thoughtfully. In future cases, they could be 
swayed on student speakers advocating a political message. Yet 
neither the message nor the merits would matter to Justice 
Thomas. 
Justice Thomas’ originalism in Morse, is a subjective 
inquiry wrapped in the gleam of objective historical analysis. 
Justice Thomas believes that the history of public education 
supports the notion that children were not expected to have a 
constitutional right of expression, and he found evidence to 
support that position in the historical record. The record also 
supports the notion that courts were not simply willing to let 
school administrators set whatever policies they wished 
without some level of inquiry and that teachers were not 
allowed to exert the full measure of parental authority over 
students. Justice Thomas ignores the changing nature of the 
nineteenth century public school system, eschewing facts in 
favor of a radical result that would overturn the settled law of 
Tinker. 
There is no sin in believing student expression to be 
dangerous or disruptive. The sin arises in the intellectual 
dishonesty used to give that fear legitimacy. 
 
